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Volume 14, Number 12 (April 24, 2008) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Structural fact and fiction 
It seems clear that the details of the Russian presidential succession were 
worked out well in advance by the incumbent and his chosen heir.  Nonetheless, 
overzealous supporters and stalwarts may have had an impact on the events as 
they have been unfolding and may continue to cause bumps along the Putin-
Medvedev trail. 
 
The most recent development reveals both prior planning and attempts to alter 
the game plan by well-connected, but outside influences.  On April 15, President 
Putin accepted the leadership of the Duma's majority party. (1)  "I am ready to 
take on the additional responsibility and to lead United Russia," Putin announced.  
He added three caveats to this decision: First, that in keeping with his sense that 
it would be "inappropriate" for a head of state to lead a party, his decision would 
not take effect until after Medvedev's inauguration, when Putin's presidential 
duties would end; second, that Boris Gryzlov effectively would lead the party's 
day-to-day activities; and, perhaps most intriguingly, that United Russia be 
reformed, including eliminating "those people who are simply there to pursue 
their selfish interests." (2) 
 
To the first point, Boris Gryzlov recently gushed that both the current and 
imminent presidents could join United Russia, but this represented a reversal of 
his earlier comments, which suggested that as President, Medvedev would be 
commander-in-chief and a military officer, making him ineligible to join United 
Russia. (3)  Nonetheless, Medvedev is unlikely to join the party, if not because it 
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would be "inappropriate," then because it would make him technically 
subordinate to Putin. 
 
As for Gryzlov's continued leadership of United Russia's daily activities, this 
decision resolves, at least temporarily, a brewing ideological dispute in UR and 
simultaneously frees Putin to concentrate on the work of the Government.  
 
Putin's third point presages a purging of the party rolls, perhaps through the 
rapidly multiplying corruption investigations.  This suggestion of a cleansing of 
the party membership again highlights the issue of just who will be in control of 
the investigations – a struggle among apparatchiki factions that already has 
grown ugly and likely will grow more desperate until it is resolved.  The process 
of purging the regional UR party rolls already has begun.  While in some cases, it 
seems to be a question of expelling those who have not paid dues; in other 
areas, arrests and investigations go hand in hand with expulsion.  According to 
Yuri Pronin, a political analyst in Irkutsk, "The process has already started in our 
region - and it sometimes involves using the law enforcement agencies."  (4) 
 
Putin's decision to head United Russia without tying himself to membership 
permits him room to maneuver in several directions.  First, it distances Putin from 
the rank and file, particularly those that might get caught up in corruption chistki.  
It also allows him to remain above party politics, possibly opening coalition 
opportunities, which would enhance his already significant sway in the 
legislature. 
 
In terms of the Putin-Medvedev diarchy, Putin has staked out both the 
governmental arm of the executive and the legislative branch.  Any attempts by 
Medvedev to veer off a mutually acceptable course can be countered by a 
legislative override, or, in an extreme scenario, impeachment proceedings.  Putin 
also will be able to block any attempt by Medvedev to oust him, and possibly his 
supporters, from the government.  
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It seems likely that Putin would have insisted from the outset on strong 
institutional checks on his chosen heir before throwing his substantial 
administrative resources behind that successor.  Medvedev certainly would have 
been expecting this development.  The question driving the mushrooming 
political rumors is what do Putin's and Medvedev's supporters anticipate gaining, 
or losing, in this transition. 
 
One kinetic political football is the supervision and support of, as well as authority 
over Russia's regions.  It appears that leaks, particularly from the "losing camps" 
around Putin (those who either supported a Sergei Ivanov succession or an 
extra-constitutional Putin third term) have focused on the creation of new regional 
administrative centers and a shift of authority over these units from the 
presidency to the prime minister and government.  It is possible that the leaks are 
meant to stem the flow of "resources" and support from regional leaders from the 
outgoing president and his team to the incoming president and his officials.  As 
yet, no definitive plan has been promulgated, and such a decision is unlikely 
before the inauguration of Medvedev, the selection of Putin as prime minister, 
and the publication of the new prime minister's plan for the government's 
structure. (5)  
 
Despite the guarantees Putin may have built into the new system for himself, the 
status of some of the "clans" around him is unclear.  Disputes that erupted last 
fall, most notably in the arrests of Federal Drug Traffic Control officers, including 
General Aleksandr Bulbov, and the arrest of Deputy Finance Minister Sergei 
Storchak, are still being engaged.  In what was seen as an effort to save his own 
position, Aleksandr Bastrykin, the head of the Corruptions Investigation 
Committee attached to the Prosecutor-General, recently fired Dmitri Dovgiy, who 
headed up the investigations into Storchak and Bulbov. (6)  This week, the lead 
investigator on the Storchak case (Storchak remains in custody until at least July  
9th as investigators continue to gather evidence) asked to be released from his 
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work on the case, ostensibly due to a heavy workload.  His request was denied.  
(7)  The arrests of Storchak and Bulbov, among others, are thought to have been 
instigated by officials associated with Igor Sechin.  
 
Sechin is a close associate of President Putin's and is likely to move into a 
government position when Putin takes up the post of prime minister.  What 
remains unclear is how many of Sechin's associates will be extended protection 
in the new Putin-Medvedev diarchy, and the stakes are remarkably high for 
individuals caught in this particular transition vortex:  lengthy prison terms, state 
appropriation of assets, and threats of physical harm are all potential 
consequences.   
 
Of course, the possibility of chastened and perhaps vengeful apparatchiki 
shuffled from the Kremlin Administration to the Government also represents a 
significant challenge to a Medvedev administration.  President Yel'tsin set an 
important precedent when he consolidated control of the power organs under the 
Russian presidency.  However, Putin is likely to retain significant cadres of 
security services personnel as advisers and associates; he also is likely to 
expand the government's remit beyond economic, financial and social policy.  
Having seasoned security veterans with grudges against members of 
Medvedev's administration could prove a Putin trump. 
 
Institutionally, the judiciary would be the obvious branch to mediate any disputes 
that might arise between Medvedev's presidency and Putin's government and 
control of the legislature.   However, the Russian judicial branch is perhaps the 
least powerful or reformed of any institutions in the post-Soviet period.  In the 
end, court appointments, i.e. cadres, could decide everything…again. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) There are increasingly vocal allegations of fraud in the Russian parliamentary 
and presidential elections. (See, for instance, "A perilous tale of 2 lions and lots 
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of jackals, by Aleksei Pankin, The Moscow Times, 22 Apr 08 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic.)  However, there seems little likelihood that protests will materialize, 
suggesting a general acceptance of the results. 
(2) President Putin, "Speech at the United Russia Congress," 15 Apr 08 via 
www.kremlin.ru, accessed 22 Apr 08. 
(3) "No party membership for Medvedev," by Rustem Falakhov, RBK Daily, No. 
65, 11 Apr 08; What the Papers Say (WPS), 14 Apr 08 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(4) "The clean out order applies to everyone," by Aleksandr Deryabin, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 Apr 08 via David Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2008-
#80, 24 Apr 08. 
(5) See, for example, "Who plenipotentiary representative will answer to," 
Vedomosti, 10 Apr 08; WPS, 10 Apr 08 via Lexis-Nexis; "Envoys to stay under 
presidential jurisdiction-Kremlin," Interfax, 11 Apr 08; Russia & CIS General 
Newswire via Lexis-Nexis Academic.  It is worthwhile to note that even upon 
publication of Putin's governmental structure, the document will remain simply 
paper until there is consensus about the real center of authority in the country. 
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XIV, No.11, 10 Apr 08; "The elite are already 
lining up behind Dmitri Medvedev, which is putting Vladimir Putin is a state 
verging on hysteria," by Natalya Royeva, 31 Mar 08; www.forum.msk.ru via JRL 
2008-#69, 4 Apr 08. 
(7) ITAR-TASS, 23 APR 08 6:14 PM EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Russia’s dreams of space dominance hampered by present issues 
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With the succession process nearly complete and his own political role outlined, 
President Vladimir Putin now is concentrating on Russia’s technological 
performance by revamping the country’s flagging space exploration program.  
Putin’s announcement came a little more than a week after Russia’s 
Cosmonautics Day, which marked the 47th anniversary of cosmonaut Yuri 
Gagarin’s inaugural 108-minute space flight aboard the Vostok (East) 1, the first 
manned flight into space. (1) 
 
This year’s Cosmonautics Day festivities centered on the unveiling of a 
monument to Laika, a stray dog that became the first living creature in space on 
November 3, 1957.  Although Laika’s flight aboard Sputnik 2 ended a few hours 
after launch when she overheated, the flight proved that living creatures could 
withstand a space launch and weightlessness; the test allowed for modifications 
that led to the first successful manned space flight less than four years later.  The 
bronze statue of a two-meter tall Vostok rocket with Laika perched on top sits in 
northwest Moscow near the Institute of Military Medicine. (2) The ceremony, 
which was televised nationally, featured well-known academicians who laid 
flowers on the monument and waxed nostalgic about Laika and other dogs used 
in the development of Russia’s space program, calling them “a friend of humans 
and … easy to train.” (3)   
 
In contrast to the celebration of Laika and Russia’s other past successes, the 
Security Council meeting focused on the future of Russian space exploration, 
outlining the developmental possibilities of the national space program until 2020. 
(4) According to Sergei Ivanov, First Deputy Prime Minister and head of Russia’s 
military-industrial development, all aspects of space activities were considered 
separately, including “manned space flights, defense security, socio-economic 
aspects of space activities, scientific and all ground-based related infrastructure, 
including the forthcoming Vostochny (Eastern) spaceport,” (5) which is scheduled 
to open by 2016, around the time that the International Space Station is 
decommissioned. (6) Construction of and support for the Vostochny spaceport, 
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scheduled to begin next winter, will necessitate the creation of an entirely new 
city in the Amur region near the Russia-China border by 2016. (7) When 
completed, the Vostochny space center will be Russia’s newest base for 
launching manned and unmanned flights and will supplement and eventually 
replace the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, as well as Plesetsk, a 
secondary station for unmanned flights located in northwest Russia. (8) Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been forced to lease the Soviet-built 
Baikonur station from the Kazakh government for US$ 115 million per year. (9) 
 
Ivanov also outlined his goal for the development of scientifically advanced 
projects with commercial value, stressing that "the exploration of the near-Earth 
space and nearest planets is not an end in itself for Russia.” (10) Also present at 
the meeting were members of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos), 
which has been criticized in recent months for allowing the program to become 
merely a “space cabby” (11) in light of its reliance on revenue generated by 
launching foreign satellites and allowing wealthy citizens and other countries to 
purchase rides on Soyuz spacecraft, as well as several failed launches and the 
stalled development of the GLONASS satellite navigation system.  In response to 
these accusations, Roskosmos officials countered that they previously had 
outlined their own vision for the Russian space program until 2040, including a 
three-stage expansion program for completing the Russian segment of the 
International Space Station, improving the boosters and transport systems 
currently in use, and conducting manned flights to the Moon and Mars, stressing 
that their only impediment was a lack of necessary financial support from the 
government. (12) 
 
Such financial support may arrive sooner than expected, as President Putin 
made it clear that the current focus on space program development may be just 
one aspect of a larger initiative focused on economic development and 
reestablishing Russia’s technological dominance, which has deteriorated as a 
result of decreased funding by the post-Soviet Russian government. According to 
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Putin, Russia needs to expand its presence on the global market for space 
products and services and not rely as heavily on foreign satellites and 
equipment. To realize this goal, he set an April 24 deadline for the entire 
government to submit proposals outlining strategies to modernize the space 
industry as a whole. (13) However, as the 7 May inauguration date of President-
elect Dmitri Medvedev approaches, it appears that any final decisions regarding 
the modernization of the Russian space program may become the purview of the 
new administration. 
 
The recent malfunctioning and crash landing of a Soyuz rocket as it attempted to 
land last weekend, may prompt Russian authorities to consider shifting their 
focus from the future to a brewing crisis unfolding in the present. On Tuesday, 8 
April, the 17th mission to the ISS left the Baikonur launch pad in Kazakhstan 
carrying the youngest-ever Russian crew and Yi So-yeon, a bioengineer who 
became the first ever South Korean astronaut after her government paid Russia 
$US 20 million for a seat on the flight. (14) There were no reported issues when 
the craft launched or when it docked with the ISS, but for the second time in a 
row and the third time to date, the Soyuz rocket experienced a less-than-perfect 
landing when it returned from space on 19 April in a “ballistic re-entry,” an 
unexpectedly steep descent into the Earth’s atmosphere that resulted in 
gravitational forces inside the capsule ten times stronger than normal to Earth.  
The malfunction also sent the spacecraft, which was carrying Yi and an American 
and a Russian astronaut who had been stationed on the ISS for six months, 260 
miles off course, where it crashed in the desert and caught on fire. (15) 
According to Russian authorities, the three passengers were reportedly unhurt, 
but later reports from South Korea maintained that Yi was hospitalized after 
returning home. (16) International experts blame the crash on the failure of the 
Soyuz spacecraft’s autopilot, radio beacons and ground-based radar, the same 
systems that apparently failed in the October 2007 Soyuz landing and reportedly 
had been fixed. 
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To date, this latest mishap, its strong similarities to the last incident, and 
accusations of rushed production in conjunction with relaxed quality control 
standards have failed to persuade the Russian government to use a different 
model of spacecraft than the Soyuz.  In fact, the firm recently was ordered by the 
Russian government to accelerate production to double the current rate. (17)  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Dmitry Solovyov, “Russia fetes dog Laika, first earthling in space,” Reuters, 
11 Apr 08 via http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
scienceNews/idUSL1117596720080411. Last accessed 21 Apr 08.  
(2) “Statue to pioneering Russian space dog unveiled in Moscow,” RIA Novosti, 
11 Apr 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080411/104875561.html. Last accessed 
21 Apr 08.  
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Putin backs spaceport work to help revive Russia’s glory,” Winston-Salem 
Journal, 12 Apr 08 via 
http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/http://www.journalnow.com/ 
servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_BasicArticle&c= 
MGArticle&cid= 1173355262741&path=!nationworld&s=1037645509161. Last 
accessed 17 Apr 08. 
(5) “Putin to hold Security Council meeting on space sector issues,” ITAR-TASS, 
11 Apr 08 via David Johnson’s Russia list (JRL), 11 Apr 08, 2008-#74. 
(6) “Russia reveals space ambitions,” Russia Today, 14 Apr 2008 via 
http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/23401.  Last accessed 21 Apr 08.  
(7) “Russia announces no more space tourists, new launch facility, new heavy-lift 
rocket,” IT Wire, 15 Apr 08 via http://www.itwire.com/content/view/17647/1066/.  
Last accessed 21 Apr 08. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) “Putin backs new space launch site,” Russia Today, 11 Apr 08 via  






(13) “Russia should promote hi-tech, not just space services – Putin,” Space 
Daily, from RIA Novosti, 14 Apr 08 via 
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russia_Should_Promote_Hi_ 
Tech_Not_Just_Space_Services_Putin_999.html. Last accessed 21 Apr 08.   
(14) “Soyuz spacecraft docks with ISS,” Russia Today, 10 Apr 08 via 
http://russiatoday.ru/scitech/news/23311.  Last accessed 21 Apr 08. 
(15) “Yi describes frightening return to Earth,” Associated Press, 21 Apr 08 via 
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5jJitDZhZSzTx3L37XQO 
plAlh8fGQD9068T9G0.  Last accessed 21 Apr 08 
(16) James Oberg, “Space crew’s hard landing raises hard questions,” MSNBC, 





Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Gordievsky targeted? 
For a number of years late in the Cold War, Oleg Gordievsky, a Colonel in the 
KGB, secretly worked for Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service. In May 1985, he 
was ordered to return to Moscow from London—where he had been the KGB’s 
Rezident, because he was suspected of treason. It is believed, but has never 
been proven conclusively, that Gordievsky’s cover was blown by CIA traitor 
Aldrich Ames. (1) British Intelligence Services succeeded in exfiltrating 
Gordievsky from the Soviet Union via Finland, and he was re-settled in Britain. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, Gordievsky has been a prominent commentator 
on Russia. He has been vocal in criticizing President Vladimir Putin’s rule, and 
was at the forefront of accusations against Russian Intelligence agencies over 
the death of Aleksandr Litvinenko in the fall of 2006. (2) During the past three 
weeks, it has emerged that Gordievsky himself may have been the target of an 
assassination attempt. 
 
In November 2007, Gordievsky collapsed at his Surrey safe-house. He was 
taken to hospital, where he allegedly lay unconscious for 34 hours. After 
regaining consciousness, he was transferred to a private clinic, where he 
remained for two weeks. Gordievsky has claimed that he was “partially 
paralysed” (he retains no feeling in his fingers) as a result, (3) and that he 
believes he was given a “variant or derivative of thallium.” (4) According to 
Gordievsky, “rogue elements in Moscow” (5) hold an assassination list, which 
contains a number of targets including Boris Berezovsky, Litvinenko and himself. 
Who those “rogue elements” are has not been explained. 
 
The Gordievsky story is not without twists: police in Surrey apparently found no 
traces of “poison or any other suspicious substance” in his body and claimed that 
he was being treated for “other medical matters.” After this was ascertained, the 
investigation reportedly was closed. (6) Gordievsky has alleged that the 
investigation was dropped as a result of a request from MI6, which wanted to 
“hush up the crime.” (7) Enquiries were only re-instituted, according to 
Gordievsky, as a result of “pressure by senior intelligence figures,” (8) and at the 
time of writing, the investigation by Special Branch is ongoing. Who ordered the 
investigation closed and then re-opened is not clear. 
 
British officials attempted to handle the Litvinenko case in a non-political manner, 
claiming that the murder was an individual act of revenge, rather than a state 
sponsored assassination. In spite of that, Russo-British relations have 
deteriorated significantly – witness the recent furor over the British Council (see 
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previous ISCIP Analysts). Whitehall several weeks ago announced that Sir 
Anthony Brenton, ambassador to Moscow, would be replaced at the end of the 
summer, in a move possibly designed to rebuild trust with the Kremlin. (9) Given 
Britain’s desire to repair Russian relations, it would not be surprising if this new 
(possible) poisoning case were to be handled in an extremely cautious manner. 
 
It is not at all inconceivable that Gordievsky would be targeted. Soviet/Russian 
intelligence agencies have a history of assassinating traitors and defectors. 
Nonetheless, any verdict or pre-emptive accusations must be withheld pending 
the investigation’s final results. If he indeed was poisoned it would raise the 
question whether anyone is safe, and of how assassins were able to gain access 
to an individual, who, considering his history, is almost certainly well protected. It 




(1) “Former KGB Defector Claims He Was Poisoned By Russians,” The 
Guardian, 7 Apr 08 via www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/apr/07/ukcrime.russia?  
(2) “Why The West Must Stand Up To Putin’s Thugs: Oleg Gordievsky Reports 
On The Fears Of Russian Exiles,” The Daily Telegraph, 21 Nov 06. 
(3) “Russian Defector ‘Survives Murder Attempt At His Surrey Safe House,’” The 
Sunday Telegraph, 6 Apr 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) “Ex-Russian Agent: I was Poisoned Just Like Litvinenko,” The Daily 
Telegraph, 7 Apr 2008 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “Ex-KGB Officer Claims Poisoning,” The Moscow Times, 7 Apr 08 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(6) “Ex-Agent: I Was Poisoned Just Like Litvinenko,” The Daily Telegraph, 7 Apr 
08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Former KGB Defector Claims He Was Poisoned By Russians,” The 
Guardian, 7 Apr 08 via www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/apr/07/ukcrime.russia?  
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(8) “Ex-Agent: I Was Poisoned Just Like Litvinenko,” The Daily Telegraph, 7 Apr 
08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “New Ambassador For Moscow Signals Start of Thawing In Relations With 




Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Arms diplomacy in North Africa 
Earlier this month, in a move to strengthen Russia’s influence in the Middle East, 
President Vladimir Putin became the first Russian leader to visit Libya since 
1985.  Putin traveled to Tripoli at the invitation of Libyan leader, Muammar 
Qaddafi for two days of talks over 16-17 April.  Arms, debt and energy dominated 
the agenda.  More than ten agreements were reached during the visit, including a 
contract for Russian rail monopoly, Russian Railways, to develop rail service in 
Libya and a major deal between Russian natural gas giant Gazprom and Libya’s 
National Oil Corporation to set up a joint oil and gas venture. (1)  
 
An agreement on military cooperation also was signed, and Russia is hoping to 
finalize an arms deal worth 2 to 4 billion dollars. (2)    Though details of the arms 
deal have not been confirmed, Russian business daily Vedomosti said last week 
that Russia wants to sell Libya SU-35 Flanker multi-role fighter aircraft, Tor-M2E 
short-range missile systems and a spare parts and maintenance service contract 
for Libya’s aging Soviet-era military hardware. (3) 
 
Oil-rich Libya is a member of OPEC and earned more than $40 billion in oil and 
natural gas revenue in 2007. (4) The North African state was an important 
partner of the Soviet Union and a major purchaser of Soviet weapons in the 
1980s.  However, after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the imposition of 
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harsh UN sanctions on Libya, relations between the two states withered and 
arms sales came to an end.  Even so, 90 percent of Libya’s current military 
equipment is Soviet made and any new arms deal likely will include 
modernization of these weapons. (5)  
 
Libya slowly is being brought back into the international community after 11 years 
of stringent UN sanctions.  The United Nations lifted sanctions in 2003, after 
Qadaffi agreed to terminate Libya’s nuclear weapons program, and Libya has 
been moving to strengthen its role in the region ever since.  These efforts will be 
furthered by Libya’s position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council as of 1 January this year. 
 
Since 2003, Libya, which is planning several large infrastructure projects, has 
been courted by Western companies hoping to win contracts; Great Britain, 
France and Germany all have negotiated large contracts since 2004. (6)  At 
present, Qadaffi is taking advantage of international good will and seems to be 
seeking to balance current political and economic ties with alternative sources of 
international support.  Russia has been trying to reestablish relations with Libya 
since 2000, but Libya apparently viewed Russia’s enthusiastic support of UN 
sanctions as a betrayal, and the road to a renewed relationship has been rocky.  
Last week’s visit and agreements were the culmination of months of negotiations; 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Libya last December to begin 
paving the way for the summit. 
 
As part of the package, Moscow has agreed to write off more than $4.5 billion in 
Libyan debt in exchange for rail, gas and arms contracts. (7)  The arms package 
is similar to the one negotiated with Algeria in 2006:  Russia will agree to forgive 
Libya’s debt and in return, Libya agrees to purchase Russian arms at a sum that 
is at least equal to the debt’s value.  This scheme so far has proven to be an 
effective way to promote Russian arms in markets previously held by the Soviet 
Union, but lost since 1991.  According to Konstantin Makinenko, Deputy Director 
 15 
of Moscow’s Center for Analysis, contracts signed with Algeria exceed $7 billion 
and Algeria has placed new orders worth several million dollars since the 2006 
deal was signed, making Algeria’s stock of contracts twice the size of its previous 
debt. (8) 
 
Russia also is moving to strengthen its influence in Egypt.  In March, Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak traveled to Moscow to meet with Putin and President-
elect Dmitri Medvedev.  The primary items on the agenda were nuclear energy 
cooperation and arms sales. Egypt has announced plans to build eight nuclear 
power stations beginning in 2009 and is holding an international tender for a $1-
1.8 billion reactor project. (9)  French companies have been lobbying hard for the 
contract, but Egypt is hoping to make the price more attractive by opening the 
bidding to wider international competition. (10)  During Mubarak’s visit the two 
leaders signed an accord on Russo-Egyptian cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy that enables Russia’s nuclear engineering company, 
Atomstroiexport, to compete for the tender. (11) 
 
As part of the agreement, Egypt reportedly is demanding that Russia’s offer 
include the possibility of administering the full cycle nuclear process, including 
uranium enrichment, on Egyptian territory, (12) something no Western bid is 
likely to include.  Russia has accepted the terms and agreed to compete for the 
tender.  In return, Moscow has hinted that it expects Cairo to return to buying 
Russian arms. (13)  Russia already has made several offers to Egypt for the sale 
of fighter aircraft and air defense systems, (14) but given the large amounts of 
US aid to Egypt ($1.8 billion in 2007) (15) and Washington’s opposition to 
Russia’s return to the Egyptian defense market, the Egyptian leadership might 
find that hard to do. 
 
Arms sales and nuclear technology are both areas in which Russia can underbid 
Western counterparts and offer “more for less.” This provides prime opportunities 
for Russia to gain leverage with potential allies.  In recent years, Russia has 
 16 
trailed only the United States in the export of conventional arms, (see Analyst 10 
Dec 07) and Moscow has indicated that it intends to stay at the top of the 
international arms market.  In fact, Russian leaders claim that Russia’s 
production of conventional arms will double by 2015, (16) and President Putin 
repeatedly has proclaimed that Russia will not be constrained in this arena.  
 
Russia has been striving to increase influence in North Africa since 2000 and has 
made significant inroads to this strategically important region. (In addition to the 
arms deals it has negotiated with Algeria, and recent deals with Egypt and Libya, 
the Russian government is currently in negotiations to help Morocco develop 
nuclear power capability.) Both Mubarak and Qadaffi are looking for ways to 
diversify political and economic ties and Russia is taking full advantage of this 
window of opportunity to counter US/Western influence and strengthen its role as 
an international power player. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Russia Cancels Libya’s $4.5 billion Debt in Exchange for Contracts,” RIA 
Novosti, 17 Apr 08 via http://en.rian.ru/world/20080417. 
(2) “Russia Could Sign $2-4 billion Arms Contracts with Libya,” RIA Novosti, 16 
Apr 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080416.  
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Putin Seeks Contracts from Libya,” International Herald Tribune, 17 Apr 08 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “Arms for Qaddafi,” Russian Press Digest (Vremya Novostey, no 64, p. 2) 15 
Apr 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) “Putin Seeks Contracts from Libya,” International Herald Tribune, 17 Apr 08 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) “Russia Cancels Libya’s $4.5 billion Debt in Exchange for Contracts,” RIA 
Novosti, 17 Apr 08 via http://en.rian.ru/world/20080417. 
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(8) “Algerian Scheme for Libyan Market,” Kommersant, 16 Apr 08 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/p882912/Russia_enters_the_Libyan_market_using
_proven_methods. 
(9) “Russia Bids for New Arms and Nuclear Contracts as Egyptian President 
Visits Moscow,” Global Insight, 25 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “Atomstroiexport Capable of Winning Egyptian NPP Tender—Experts,” 
ITAR-TASS, 25 Mar 08 via World News Connection. 
(12) “Russia Bids for New Arms and Nuclear Contracts as Egyptian President 
Visits Moscow,” Global Insight, 25 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 




(15) US Aid Web site via 
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/middle_east/countries/egypt/egypt.html.  
(16) “Russia’s Production of Conventional Arms to Double by 2015,” ITAR-TASS, 
26 Mar 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Fabian Adami 
 
NATO rhetoric undiminished  
During the last few months, Russia has addressed critically the possibility of 
NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. In mid-March, during a US 
delegation’s visit to Moscow, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that NATO’s 
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expansion was reminiscent of the construction of “cold war blocs,” which would 
have a “destructive” impact on Russian-US relations. This viewpoint was 
reiterated by Lavrov days before April’s NATO summit in Bucharest, during an 
interview in which he claimed that Moscow would be forced to examine the 
“reliability of these partners” from the “security” perspective, were they to be 
admitted to the Atlantic Alliance. (1) 
 
The NATO summit resulted in a partial victory for Russia, due to the fact that 
European members of the Alliance, specifically France and Germany, objected to 
Georgian and Ukrainian membership, largely on the grounds that Moscow should 
not be unnecessarily aggravated. However, membership for Georgia and Ukraine 
was not rejected, but rather will be reviewed in December 2008. (2) 
 
Since the end of the NATO summit, it has become evident that Moscow remains 
deeply concerned about Georgia and Ukraine. Speaking at a conference at St. 
Petersburg University on the results of the NATO summit, Sergei Ryabkov, 
Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of European Cooperation 
noted that “broad hints” in favor of membership for Ukraine and Georgia already 
had been heard, and that “the expectations of a whole group of NATO countries 
are obvious.” (3) If this were to occur, according to Ryabkov, “the conclusions of 
our country will be most far-reaching.” (4) 
 
Two weeks ago, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ohryzko traveled to 
Moscow for talks with Lavrov. Although the one-day visit was not conducive to a 
full exchange of views, Ohryzko apparently sought to convince Lavrov that 
Ukrainian membership in NATO would “in no way threaten Russia.” (5) Lavrov 
and Ohryzko agreed to hold in-depth consultations on the matter, which will 
“begin shortly.” (6) Ohryzko claimed that his visit was a success, because the 
Ukrainian team had “succeeded” in presenting its “point of view” about a number 
of issues. (7) 
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Ohryzko’s reaction to the meeting in Moscow, while possibly intended for 
domestic consumption, is clearly overly optimistic. Russia is intent on maintaining 
its pressure on Kiev, as demonstrated by the question of the Black Sea Fleet. 
During his visit, Ohryzko presented Lavrov with a memorandum on the removal, 
by 2018, of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet from ports in the Ukraine. Kiev apparently 
wishes to begin discussions now, on how the Russian Navy’s withdrawal is to be 
handled. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s reaction to this memorandum was to 
state that the matter was “not urgent,” (8) while Moscow’s Ambassador to Kiev, 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, argued that it was too “premature” to even discuss the 
question. (9) 
 
After Ohryzko’s departure from Moscow, Lavrov, in a statement posted on the 
Foreign Ministry website argued that NATO had ignored the Ukrainian and 
Georgian peoples’ wishes on membership, and insisted that the alliance is trying 
to substitute the UN with its own structures: “this is either an attempt to form 
some new global union with a western core wishing to claim all but UN functions. 
Or-which is more likely—this is about the logic of bloc absorption of territory…first 
to mark it and then consider it its own.” (10) 
 
Russia clearly is intent on maintaining its pressure on Ukraine and Georgia, 
albeit in different ways. In the Ukrainian case, Moscow likely believes that the 
threat of Russian military elements remaining on Ukrainian soil provides 
leverage. Tactics with regards to Georgia are different, but equally unsubtle: 
Russia, says Lavrov, must protect the rights of “Russian citizens” in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, so that they are not “subjected to provocations, and can 
freely communicate with Russia.” (11) Of course, Moscow unilaterally bestowed 
Russian citizenship on most Abkhazians and South Ossetians. 
 
In Brief: Moscow’s ABM demands  
During last month’s talks between Secretaries of State and Defense Condoleeza 
Rice and Robert Gates with their counterparts in Moscow, the US apparently 
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offered Russia the opportunity to verify that the planned missile defense system 
“does not work against” it and proposed that the “condition of an interceptor 
missile base to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic” could be 
examined by Russian officials. At the time, Lavrov welcomed these proposals, 
acknowledging that they amounted to recognition of Moscow’s concerns. (12) 
Now, it seems that simple verification and assessment are not enough for 
Moscow. On 9 April, Lavrov stated that Russian military officers should have a 
“permanent presence” at the proposed bases, as well as “secure means for 
technical monitoring.” (13) Lavrov claimed that the US proposal provided for only 
temporary visits to the bases by officers stationed at the embassies in Prague 
and Warsaw—an idea that is currently unacceptable to Moscow. As of the time of 
writing, the Polish government already had effectively vetoed the idea of Russian 
observers on its soil (14), and it is therefore unclear, what the next step in ABM 
defense negotiations may be. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 10 (27 Mar 08). 
(2) “NATO Denies Georgia and Ukraine,” BBC News 3 Apr 08 via 
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7328276.stm.  
(3) “Moscow Expects Ukraine, Georgia To Be Granted NATO MAP In 
December,” Interfax, 18 Apr 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) “Pragmatism Seen Guiding Principle in Russo-Ukrainian Foreign Minister 
Talks Yevgeni Shestakov Report: ‘We’re Talking About Mars: The Ukrainian 
Foreign Minister Has Promised To Be Pragmatic in Relations with Russia,” 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 17 Apr 08; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection. 
(6) “Kiev, Moscow To Have Consultations On Ukraine’s Accession To NATO,” 
ITAR-TASS, 16 Apr 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(7) Ibid. 
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novostey, 17 Apr 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Gazprom in Libya: Gas-OPEC on the horizon? 
In April of this year, Gazprom closed a deal with Libya's National Oil Corporation 
to set up a joint venture to engage in both upstream and downstream oil and gas 
operations. (1) The Gazprom deal was part of a larger agreement signed by 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, (for more 
on these agreements, please see Armed Forces section below) in which Moscow 
wrote off $4.5 billion in Tripoli’s Soviet-era debt in exchange for multi-billion dollar 
contracts with Russian companies, including Rosoboronexport and Russian 
Railways, as well as with Gazprom. (2) The deal, which appeared to be a replay 
of Moscow’s 2006 gas production agreement with Algeria, once again has raised 
concerns that Russia is seeking to create a gas cartel similar to oil-producing 
nations’ OPEC. (3) Evidence that Moscow is planning to head a gas cartel has 
been mounting, according to Igor Tomberg, an energy expert at the Institute of 
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World Economy and International Relations in Moscow; he notes that Iran 
already has drafted a charter for the new organization that, if approved, would 
formalize the many cartel-type agreements that Russia has signed in recent 
years with other gas-producing nations. (4) 
 
What would a gas cartel look like? Russia is already a member of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), a little known and little understood 
organization made up of the national energy ministries of sixteen gas-exporting 
countries, accounting for about 40 percent of pipeline gas sales and over 90 
percent of the total volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) sold in 2006. (5) It is 
not clear what constitutes membership in the GECF, since there are no statutes 
or charters, or membership fees, and not all members presently are exporting 
gas. (6) The forum was established in Tehran in 2001 with the general aim of 
generating “tangible cooperation among gas producing and exporting countries,” 
and in subsequent years, ministers have been at pains to emphasize that the 
club is not, nor is it intended to be, a “gas-OPEC.” (7) Nevertheless, analysts 
claim that the forum does not exist solely for the benign purpose of consultation 
with other energy industry players, but is instead an organization that is 
appraising the potential for its eventual transformation into a gas cartel capable 
of setting international prices for natural gas and dividing downstream markets 
between its member countries. (8) 
 
Gazprom’s recent deals with GECF member countries—Iran, Algeria, and 
Libya—may portend just such a transformation of the forum, from a loose 
association of gas-producing countries into an “OGEC,” a gas version of OPEC, 
described by Daniel Yergin, an energy analyst and founder of Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates in Massachusetts, as an energy organization made up by a 
few countries that come to dominate the supply of natural gas and adopt policies 
reminiscent of the confrontational OPEC of the 1970s. (9) Signs that gas-
producing countries are prepared to carve up the markets among themselves 
already are emerging. Encouraged by Vladimir Putin’s endorsement of gas 
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OPEC as “an interesting idea,” (10) Tehran has offered to re-orient its future gas 
exports to the east, supplying Pakistan and India via a new pipeline route, while 
Russia continues to dominate European markets to the west. (11) At present, a 
quarter of Europe’s natural gas comes from Gazprom, and Algeria supplies 
another 13 percent of Europe’s total gas needs. Libya is another important 
source of natural gas volumes for the European market, and, with Gazprom 
preparing to pipe natural gas from Libya across the Mediterranean to southern 
Italy, it is in a key position to increase Russia’s influence over Europe’s total 
energy supply further. “It is very important what Gazprom is doing in Libya and 
other parts of North Africa,” Tomberg, the energy expert in Moscow, said. “By 
diversifying its supplies and gaining even more access to European markets, 
geopolitically, it is surrounding Europe.” (10) 
 
The expectation of a gas-OPEC, or OGEC, is perhaps premature. Certainly, the 
two organizations cannot be analogous, given the very different nature of the oil 
and gas industries. Until the introduction of LNG, natural gas was a local, 
national, or continental industry, limited by the reach of pipelines. Unlike oil, 
which is transported on huge tankers to international ports, gas had to be moved 
over land, through channels linking producers directly to consumers. This has 
meant that natural gas exporters are less responsive to shifts in price or markets, 
and contracts tend to be long-term—lasting from 20 to 25 years. (13) While LNG 
allows for greater flexibility of transport and delivery, it is also a much more 
expensive option: the cost to transport natural gas by tanker is around eight 
times that of transporting the same calorific value of oil. (14) In all its forms, gas 
is a capital-intensive industry that requires guaranteed downstream markets to 
justify huge investments in extraction upstream. There is little surplus capacity 
with which to manipulate markets, and the price of natural gas is generally 




The most significant impediment to OGEC is Russia itself. With the world’s 
largest reserves of natural gas, Russia is a titan among gas producers and it is 
highly unlikely that the country would consent to participate in an energy 
organization that it does not dominate. Gazprom’s deal with Libya points to a 
different model of cooperation among gas-producing countries, wherein Moscow 
uses political leverage—the ability to wipe out national debt, for example—to gain 
favorable concessions from less powerful countries and thereby to increase its 
share of the global natural gas market. The seventh Ministerial Meeting of the 
GECF will take place in Moscow this summer, and it remains to be seen whether 
Russia will throw its weight behind a cooperative cartel that might empower its 
fellow gas producers to act as its equals. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Adjara, tourism, and foreign investment 
Following the Rose Revolution and the subsequent successful ousting of Adjaran 
strongman Aslan Abashidze in May 2004, the Black Sea region of Adjara has 
been the scene of considerable change. 
 
The first changes were political. Under the law governing Adjara’s relationship 
with the state, signed on 29 July 2004, the President of Georgia nominates the 
Chairman of the Government of Adjara. The nomination is subject to approval by 
the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, but that body can 
be dissolved by the president if it rejects his nominee twice. The chairman is 
responsible to the president of Georgia and to the Adjaran Supreme Council; 
however it is very clear that the Georgian president takes precedent. The 
chairman’s selections for the Government have to be vetted by “the officials of 
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proper authorities of the Government of Georgia” before they can be submitted to 
the Adjaran Supreme Council. (1)  The Chairman is at least authorized to dismiss 
ministers. Neither the Chairman nor state ministers are permitted to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity or receive a salary other than the one they receive from 
the state with the exception of activity that could be considered academic 
research. (2) 
 
Levan Varshalomidze is the current chairman of the Adjaran Supreme Council, 
as well as a National Movement candidate for the Georgian parliament. He was 
confirmed as chairman in July 2004, having served previously under the title of 
Envoy of the President of Georgia in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara since 
Abashidze’s ouster that May. (3)  His educational background is in law, but he 
also has worked in business and, perhaps most importantly, was Chairman of the 
Executive Department at the Ministry of Justice of Georgia from 2000-2002 
during current President Mikheil Saakashvili’s tenure as Minister of Justice. (4) 
 
The secondary changes in Adjara have been physical. Adjara is experiencing a 
construction boom at the moment, as Georgia works to make it a thriving tourist 
center. According to the Department of Tourism and Resorts, Georgia anticipates 
that about 1.3 million tourists will visit the country this year, (5) many of whom will 
head to the Adjaran capital of Batumi on the Black Sea coast. Batumi is a 
destination for growing numbers of Turks, Armenians, Azeris, Ukrainians and 
residents of the Baltic states. (6) 
 
The return of Adjara to the Georgian fold, coupled with its location on the Black 
Sea and an emphasis on the expansion of the tourist industry by the Georgian 
government, has led to a surge in investment in the region. Among those 
investing in the region are Kazakh businesses–$100 million in more than 20 
hotels as of January 2006. (7)  Additionally, the Kazakh state-owned gas 
company KazMunaiGas added the Batumi Sea Port and Batumi Oil Terminal 
Limited and Batumi Sea Port Limited to its holdings in January 2008. (8) 
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Turkish investment in Adjara also has been substantial; it was estimated at $250 
million as of April 2008. (9)  The total Adjaran state expenditure for 2008 is about 
171 million lari (approximately $118.5 million), (10) making Turkish investment in 
the region more than double the entire state budget. In keeping with the flow of 
Turkish investment, Batumi airport recently was refurbished by TAV-Urban, a 
Turkish consortium, and now is considered for economic purposes as domestic 
Turkish airspace. (11)  As a result, Batumi offers considerably cheaper flights to 
Turkey than from the rest of Georgia. 
 
However, the increase in investment is not necessarily translating into jobs for 
the local population. Varshalomidze recently importuned the Georgian 
government to devise a program offering cheap credit to Adjarans, complaining 
that the recent flow of investment has not translated into more employment for 
locals. Even government positions are filled primarily by non-Adjaran natives. 
(12)  Despite the massive investment in the Adjaran capital (or perhaps because 
of its failure, as yet, to translate into many new jobs), Batumi was the sight of an 
anti-Saakashvili demonstration numbering “several thousand” in October 2007, in 
the lead-up to the larger protests that took place in Tbilisi in November 2007 
before being forcibly dispersed by the government. (13) 
 
Tourism is anticipated as a major source of potential revenue by the Georgian 
government. One of Saakashvili’s most visible projects during his tenure, much 
derided by Georgians who think he should have other priorities, is the building of 
parks and fountains in many public venues. In theory, making public spaces 
attractive and investing in projects such as the refurbishing of Tbilisi’s Rustaveli 
Prospect add to Georgia’s potential allure as a tourist destination. More 
practically, Tbilisi billboards proudly announce several sites to be the future 
location of five star hotels, although how Georgia will find sufficient clientele to fill 
so many elite establishments is a bit unclear. Much investment also has been 
poured into the walled town of Sighnagi, in hopes of drawing tourists there by 
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pairing its location in the Kakheti region (renowned for its wine) with the attractive 
surroundings of its ancient walls and newly built shops. The Georgian 
government has invested roughly 10 million lari (around $6.9 million) into the 
project, with an additional 28 million lari (approximately $19.3 million) coming 
from private interests. (14)  A simple stroll around Sighnagi reveals the 
impressive, if slightly artificial, restorative work that has been done. The town 
even boasts a tourist information center replete with glossy color brochures 
detailing Georgia’s scenic offerings.  
 
Tbilisi’s attempts to capture investment in its tourist industry have been admirable 
and are part of the general crusade to attract foreign investment to Georgia. It 
may take time, however, for that investment to have a positive impact on the bulk 
of Georgia’s population, including the residents of Adjara. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) “Law of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara on Structure, Authorities, and 
Rules for Activities of Government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, 
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(2) “Law of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara on Structure, Authorities, and 
Rules for Activities of Government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, 
Chapter Four: Government Officials, Article 12,” and “Law of the Autonomous 
Republic of Adjara on Structure, Authorities, and Rules for Activities of 
Government of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, Chapter Seven: The 
Ministries, Article 26,” Government of Autonomous Republic of Adjara website 
via http://www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=law. 
(3) “Chairman of Government,” Government of Autonomous Republic of Adjara 
website via http://www.adjara.gov.ge/eng/index.php?page=chairman. 
(4) Ibid.  
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kyrgyzstan swaps land, favors for Kazakh grain and oil imports  
At first glance, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s recent trip to Astana to 
attend the 7th meeting of the Kyrgyz-Kazakh Supreme Interstate Council 
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appears to have been a resounding success, garnering promises from the 
Kazakh government to supply 300,000 tons of oil annually to Kyrgyzstan’s 
refineries and to increase its investments significantly in Kyrgyz joint ventures 
(Kazakhstan already accounts for 50% of foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan). (1)  
During what was by all accounts a very cordial meeting, Presidents Nazarbaev 
and Bakiev also discussed making Kyrgyzstan a party to the Turkmen-Chinese 
gas pipeline project. (2)  Furthermore, in a rather surprising, but very fortuitous 
turn of events, Kazakh officials agreed to provide a total of 350,000 tons of wheat 
to the Kyrgyz State Material Reserves Fund, in spite of a recent decision to ban 
all further grain exports. (3)  Just two days prior to Bakiev’s arrival in Astana, 
Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov announced that in order to protect 
domestic consumers, his government had decided to ban additional grain exports 
until September 2008, although flour exports would continue.  Even though 
Kazakhstan had a record wheat harvest in 2007 and is Central Asia’s main grain 
producer, inflation rose to nearly 19% last year, mainly in response to a jump in 
food prices. (4)  The Kazakh government’s willingness to make an immediate 
exception to its just announced grain export ban for a neighbor state, which likely 
is not paying market prices, is certainly a noteworthy development. 
 
Astana’s apparent magnanimity may be a partial pay-off for the Kyrgyz 
parliament’s decision to ratify the Kyrgyz-Kazakh border delimitation treaty on 
April 11. (5)  According to the treaty, Kyrgyzstan must relinquish a granite mine in 
Talas Province, the Karkyra area in Issykkul Province, as well as a section of 
territory near the river Chu to Kazakhstan.  The Kazakh government also will be 
permitted to take out long-term leases on four tourist resorts on Lake Issykul, 
long one of Central Asia’s most popular vacation destinations.  The parliament’s 
justification for this decision was that Kazakhstan had paid for the resorts’ 
construction in the years before the Soviet Union’s collapse.   Kyrgyzstan will 
receive a section of territory in Chuy Province, which juts down into farmland 
belonging to the village of Stepnoe, forcing residents to travel far out of their way 
to reach their crops. (6)  Although Bakiev’s government and supporters in 
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parliament are enthusiastic about the border delimitation deal, public sentiment is 
very much against it.  Residents of Issykkul Province have formed the “Protection 
of Sacred Land committee” to lobby for the treaty’s reversal and are planning a 
march to Bishkek to protest against it, on the grounds that the treaty contravenes 
the interests of both the state of Kyrgyzstan and its citizens. (7)  The treaty was 
first agreed upon between former President Askar Akaev and his Kazakh 
counterpart in 2001, but due to its unpopularity was never ratified by Kyrgyz 
legislators until this year. (8)  The public’s dissatisfaction with the terms of the 
treaty is understandable, especially in Issykkul Province, where residents could 
stand to lose considerable income, depending on how the Kazakh government 
chooses to use the four resorts.  Bakiev’s decision to lease the resorts to 
Kazakhstan does seems particularly odd in light of the fact that on April 18 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov outlined a three-year development plan for 
Issykkul and Naryn Provinces that, among other things, seeks to make 
improvements in local infrastructure and boost the tourism industry. (9)  Issykkul 
residents and Bakiev’s other opponents may interpret this as an additional perk 
for Kazakhstan – the Kyrgyz government funding improvements to tourism 
facilities for the profit of Kazakh companies. 
 
In addition to signing the border delimitation treaty, President Bakiev also 
pledged to support Nazarbaev’s long-held wish to form a “Central Asian Union.” 
(10)  The Kazakh president has been lobbying for closer integration between the 
Central Asian republics for some years now, arguing that “we are again 
witnessing superpower rivalry for economic dominance in our region. We have to 
address correctly this new global and geo-economics challenge. We have a 
choice between remaining the supplier of raw materials to the global markets and 
wait[ing] patiently for the emergence of the next imperial master or to pursue 
genuine economic integration of the central Asian region.” (11)  Nazarbaev has 
spoken out on this topic at various meetings with other Central Asian leaders, 
including meetings of various CIS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) bodies, but until now, only Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has voiced 
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any support for the idea (12) and it seemed destined to languish in inertia.  
Although Bakiev’s backing in and of itself does not make the proposal a sure 
thing, it might help gain the support of either Uzbek President Islom Karimov, or 
more likely Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov.  Without the 
endorsement of at least one of the leaders of these two economically powerful 
states, it is doubtful that any further progress can occur. 
 
The two presidents agreed to cooperate on one additional and very thorny issue, 
namely the division of their countries’ water resources.  (13)  Representatives of 
the Central Asian states have been attempting to reach some agreement on 
water use for at least the past decade, through both bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations, some of which have been sponsored by outside entities, such as 
the EU.  Water is not only essential for the region’s agriculture, but also for 
producing electrical power in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  With both of those 
countries now urgently seeking investors to build a series of new dams and 
hydropower stations in the wake of this winter’s severe energy shortages, an 
agreement on water use has become critical.  A meeting between Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek officials to sign an agreement on the division and use of 
the Syrdarya river basin’s water and energy resources has been scheduled in 
Bishkek for the end of this month; (14) if Bakiev makes good on his promise and 
supports Kazakhstan’s position on the matter, it might ensure that a) the 
agreement is actually signed and b) that its terms favor Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  Should the Syrdarya pact be implemented, it could serve as a 
model to resolve other regional conflicts over water use. 
 
The question still remains, however, whether or not the Kyrgyz public will let 
Bakiev’s promises to Kazakhstan stand or whether his attempt to pull a fast one 
by whisking the border delimitation treaty through the parliamentary approval 
process (in a parliament made up of an overwhelming majority of Bakiev’s own 
party members) will backfire and do what the Kyrgyz opposition has not been 
able to do for the past year: spark widespread anti-Bakiev protests and bring the 
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country’s citizens back out onto the streets to defend their interests in the face of 
Bakiev’s ever more corrupt and self-serving practices. 
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UKRAINE 
Will Tymoshenko finish what Yushchenko began? 
During the last two weeks, Ukraine’s cold war between President Viktor 
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko turned hot.  The two leaders, 
who led the 2004 “orange revolution” together and now head the two parties in 
the ruling “orange coalition,” appear to have abandoned all pretense of unity.  
They are championing competing legislation in areas as diverse as privatization 
and education reform, and have declared themselves in favor of diametrically 
opposed amendments to the constitution.  New parliamentary elections—the 
third such elections in three years—now seem increasingly possible as the 
governing coalition appears to be coming apart at the seams. 
 
The war between the president and the government emerged from the back 
rooms into the full view of the public when Presidential Secretariat Head Viktor 
Baloha placed a rambling, often incoherent statement attacking the Prime 
Minister on Yushchenko’s official website.  Baloha—who is called the “gray 
cardinal” in Ukraine’s media—called Tymoshenko a “mercenary” who is 
conducting “shady deals” with “secret agreements” allowing massive theft of 
state funds.  He mocked Tymoshenko’s statement that a “land mafia” is 
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interfering with her attempts to auction state land publicly by suggesting that “the 
leader of government simply wants to head this mafia herself.” (1)   
 
Baloha’s statements received significant attention but little traction within 
Ukraine, where he is largely distrusted by the populace as a secretive mini-
oligarch.  In fact, the respected Ukrayinska Pravda online news source recently 
examined Baloha’s connection to a questionable privatization deal during 
December 2007 in his home base of Transcarpathia.    
 
Ukrayinska Pravda posted documents, which it said demonstrated that the head 
of the Presidential Secretariat had encouraged the privatization of military 
housing units and the land associated with them in Mukachevo, and then created 
shell companies in order to compete against himself in the tender.  The website 
said it confirmed that Baloha’s wife and the wife of the former Mayor of 
Mukachevo (now a parliamentary deputy in Yushchenko’s bloc) created one of 
the firms bidding for the Mukachevo property.  The investigators also alleged that 
the second company was owned by an accountant associated with one of 
Baloha’s firms. The journalists, therefore, labeled the privatization “a farce” since 
“all participants are connected to each other.”  The winning firm paid 
approximately 1.2 million dollars.  (2) Neither Baloha nor anyone involved in the 
privatization process has been charged with any wrongdoing.     
 
At the same time, Tymoshenko is viewed by voters as one of the countries most 
committed reformers, who has been able to repel personal attacks by calling 
them attacks on her anti-corruption reform agenda.    
 
Following the lack of response to his initial statement, Baloha upped his rhetoric, 
suggesting that all those in the cabinet with economic portfolios should resign.   
The cabinet had not dealt with “negative trends” in the economy, he said, leading 
to inflation of almost 10 percent as of March.  (3)  
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In fact, Baloha is correct that inflation is the most difficult issue currently facing 
the government, and one that must be adequately addressed.  However, in a 
report released last week, the IMF suggested that the current inflation surge 
“should fall gradually,” ending at roughly 17 percent, December to December.  
The organization took note, though, of numerous “uncertainties” in the economy, 
most notably steel prices and “intensified global market turbulence.” (4)   Balazs 
Horvath, the IMF’s permanent representative in Ukraine further suggested that 
the government and the central bank “have been taking steps [regarding inflation] 
and many of those steps are, in our view, quite positive.”  Moreover, “If the 
central bank and the government cooperate in an effective manner, then certainly 
it is possible to attain inflation that is significantly lower on a 12-month basis than 
it is at present.” (5) Tymoshenko recently pointed out that her government 
entered office following a major upturn in inflation, from under 10 percent in 2006 
to over 17 percent under the government of Viktor Yanukovych in 2007.  
 
Horvath’s admonition that the government and the central bank must work 
together is important; Petro Poroshenko, the head of the Council of the National 
Bank of Ukraine (NBU), was once a close ally of President Yushchenko and has 
a very strained relationship with Tymoshenko.  His loyalties today are not entirely 
clear, although he was placed in his position by Yushchenko.    
 
Worryingly, Yushchenko recently suggested that the NBU had “already done 
enough” regarding inflation and that the government’s expenses were to blame 
for the situation. (6)  While expenses (and in particular social expenditures) are 
an important part of the inflationary cocktail, this sole focus contradicts calls from 
international economists and institutions for the NBU to remove the local 
currency’s peg to the dollar.   “Ukraine imports the inflation of rising international 
food and energy prices through its dollar peg,” wrote Anders Aslund of the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics.  “The inflation will continue to rise 
if the dollar plummets.” (7) In its report, the IMF also cited the need for the NBU 
to remove the dollar peg.  
 37 
 
Echoing these statements, Tymoshenko recently complained that her control 
over the Bank is limited.  “The government has no influence on the central bank," 
she said.  "But it is known that the central bank is coupling our currency very 
closely to the dollar. Foreign experts say that inflation is being imported in this 
way."  (8)   
 
On 24 April, Poroshenko suggested that the bank may allow more flexibility in the 
hryvnia exchange rate, and in fact, the bank has allowed the currency to 
strengthen to slightly above the upper limit of the peg.  There is no indication that 
the peg will be removed, however, while Tymoshenko has shown little intention 
of limiting social spending.  
 
Therefore, it appears that inflation already may be developing into a weapon to 
be used in the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko war.  
 
Meanwhile, Yushchenko and Baloha have inundated Tymoshenko with 
“demands” for government action.   Tymoshenko recently noted that, in less than 
four months, her office has received 880 “demands” from the president, 
compared to only 260 demands sent to the previous government in more than 
one year.  (9) The previous government of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was 
replaced after Yushchenko branded it “criminal.”  Nevertheless, Yanukovych 
received far less attention from Yushchenko than the current government – which 
is ostensibly in a coalition with the president.  
 
The demands have included general orders to limit inflation, instructions to speed 
up preparations for Ukraine’s co-hosting of the 2012 UEFA European Football 
Championships, an order to “take appropriate measures to help victims” of a 
military helicopter crash, and a suggestion to consider the “restoration of the 
Ukrainian Falcons aerobatic team.” Demands generally were made in letters sent 
to Tymoshenko and released to the media simultaneously.  (10)    
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Tymoshenko’s response to the receipt of an average of more than eight demand 
letters each day coupled with criticism from Baloha initially was muted. “I value 
the unity of the coalition,” she said, “and will not allow any individual to destroy it.”  
(11) 
 
In late February, the respected weekly newspaper Den wrote, “In the little over 
two months of her premiership, there has been a great deal of criticism from 
Bankova Street [location of presidential secretariat] about Yulia Tymoshenko and 
the work of her government.  However, the head of the executive power 
[government] is responding to these critical outbursts in an unusual way – by 
saying nothing.”  (12) 
 
Baloha’s opposition to Tymoshenko is unlikely to be based on the Prime 
Minister’s work as premier, since his criticism began almost immediately after 
Tymoshenko took office in late December.  Instead, Baloha’s dislike of the Prime 
Minister is widely thought to be based upon several concerns:  (a) the potential 
effect of Tymoshenko’s privatization drive on his business interests, (b) the 
impact of her attempts to reform state structures on his position, and (c) 
Tymoshenko’s refusal to accept his input or “advice.” 
 
Regardless, in April, Yushchenko stepped up his “oversight” of the government.  
In particular, attacks on Tymoshenko’s ambitious privatization program became 
an important part of the President’s arsenal.  
 
On 11 April, Yushchenko suspended via two decrees the privatizations of four 
major energy generation companies that were expected to gather at least 500 
million dollars for the government.  His decrees also cancelled the privatization of 
two state-owned research institutes, an iron ore mining facility, and a shipyard.  
Yushchenko, the head of the State Property Fund (who is a member of the 
Socialist Party), and several Ukrainian businessmen with energy ties accused 
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Tymoshenko of rushing into “mass sale of state property” without adequate 
preparation.  (13)  
 
Then on 15 April, Yushchenko cancelled the privatization of the Odesa Port 
Chemical Plant, which had a starting price of 600 million dollars.  The State 
Property Fund had received 15 requests for the privatization document package 
and was anticipating up to one billion dollars in revenue from the sale.  (14) 
Yushchenko charged that transport pipes associated with the plant would also be 
privatized, which would be against Ukrainian interests; the government denied 
this charge. (15) In 2006 and 2007, the parliament approved all privatizations 
planned by the government for this year.  
 
Yushchenko’s decrees regarding privatization are carried out by the loyal head of 
the Fund, Valentina Semenyuk, a Socialist hold-over from the previous leftist 
government.  In February, Semenyuk was suspended by the cabinet, pending an 
investigation of complaints about improper disposal of state property during the 
previous government.  Viktor Baloha immediately responded.  “I propose that the 
government should withdraw its decision to suspend Semenyuk,” he said.  
“Otherwise, the president will definitely issue a decree suspending the 
government's resolution as anti-constitutional." (16)  Yushchenko then signed a 
decree overruling the suspension.  
 
At the same time, the president overturned the government’s plans to auction 
public land.  The plan “is a new corrupt scheme,” he said on his official website. 
(17) 
 
Two days later, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) for the first time responded 
forcefully.  In an official statement, the bloc accused the president and his allies 
of “anti-Ukrainian measures,” including “total ruination of all initiatives of the 
democratic government,” “blocking all anti-corruption initiatives of the 
government,” “creation of panic and hysteria regarding inflation,” “halting of 
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civilized privatization,” “taking into their hands shadow schemes in the gas 
sphere,” “providing cover for the corrupt leadership of the State Property Fund, 
… and disgracing the Ukrainian state.” (18)   
 
Simultaneously, Tymoshenko announced her full support for the transfer of 
Ukraine from a parliamentary-presidential to a parliamentary republic.  “The time 
has come to demarcate the functions of the authorities and make Ukraine a 
traditional parliamentary republic,” she told a meeting of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg.  (19)  The implication, of course, is 
that the office of the president would be either removed or very sharply curtailed.  
Later, Tymoshenko suggested that she would not work toward the removal of the 
presidential office, but would attempt to limit its functions to that of a traditional 
Western European head of state with no legal ability to impact domestic policy.  
(20)  
 
She also suggested to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that her tension with 
Yushchenko is because “the president is thinking about the … presidential 
election [scheduled for 2009] and sees me as a competitor.”  (21)  In fact, 
according to the latest survey by the respected Razumkov Center, if a 
presidential poll were held today, 27.8% would support Viktor Yanukovych, 
25.3% would vote for Tymoshenko, while only 11.6% would cast their ballot for 
Yushchenko.  Furthermore, BYuT is predicted to place first in any special 
parliamentary elections that could be triggered by constitutional changes. (22) 
 
There is no doubt that something must be done.  Ukraine now suffers from an 
unworkable balance of power between the president and prime minister.  The 
constitution creates many overlapping duties, while remaining silent on others, 
leaving them at the mercy of power politics.  
 
In response to Tymoshenko, Yushchenko is championing aggressively a return 
to a stronger presidency, from a parliamentary-presidential to a presidential-
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parliamentary form of government.  But, given his low poll numbers, he will need 
to tread lightly regarding constitutional changes, for fear of triggering new 
elections.  It may be too late, however.  His lack of a light hand with Tymoshenko 
already may have spurred her to use every method at her disposal to limit his 
power or potentially to eliminate the presidential office altogether.  
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